Introduction. Regional councils in the Netherlands are composed of seats that simultaneously represent both townships and political parties [2] . The stated intent is that each township should receive a number of seats proportional to its population and each party a number of seats proportional to its total vote. The ideal or proportionality is as old as the hills and by now commonplace: given a vector of real numbers P = (P, .., P,), j > 0, f = (f,.., f,,) summing to h > 0 is proportional to p if f = Xp for X > 0, and that is the end of the story. But when f is subject to other constraints-for example, cj fj < cf for all j-then what should it mean to say that f is "proportional to" p? And when, in addition, the fi are to be numbers of seats and so integer, what then? This is the (vector) apportionment problem: how to allocate representation in a house of h seats among regions or townships (of populations p) or among political parties (having vote totals p). A theory of apportionment has been developed that gives a meaning to proportionality in this setting [6] , and so an approach to determining how many seats each township should receive and how many each party should receive in a Dutch regional council. But if pij is the number of votes in township i for party j how many candidates on the list of party j in township i should be declared elected? The reflex response is, proportional numbers: but what precisely does this mean? There are two types of constraints. One type demands that the total number allocated to a township add up to the number it deserves, and to a party the number it deserves; the other type asks that these allocations be integer values. Our aim is to arrive at axiomatic definitions of proportionality between matrices when one must satisfy (i) the first constraints only (the real case) and (ii) both types of constraints (the integer case).
The simpler real case is addressed first: given a matrix p > 0 of real numbers what should it mean to say that a matrix of real numbers subject to bounds on row and column sums is "proportional to" p? Axioms are proposed that yield a unique solution (when such exist) which turns out to have been the subject of prior work much used in I. Proportionality in reals. Intuitively one can see that a fair share matrix departs from the usual proportional matrix only via multipliers of rows and columns, a multiplier being greater than one (or less than one) only if it must be to meet the lower bound (or to meet the upper bound) requirement.
An alternative description is sometimes useful. A matrix f satisfies conditions (2) for a problem (p, a) if Given f -f' # 0 and the fact that loops of alternating signs are forbidden there is some row or column where the respective sums over f and f' are different, say fiN > fN-. We will show below that then there exists some j E N such that fMi > f,i and x1yi > xyj'. But fiN > f/N implies there is some other row, say row 2, with f2N < f2'. An identical argument shows that there exists some g E N with fMg < fjg and x2yg < x;yg, and thus xlx2yjyg < xlxyijyg. This gives the sought for contradiction: fiN > f{N and f2N < f2N implies x1 < x2 and x > x2, whereas fMj > f; and fMg < f/g implies yj < yg and yj' > yg so xlx2yjyg > xxxyjyjg. conditions for x are verified similarly, and this completes the proof. * We may now refer unequivocally to "the fair share method" F*. It should be remarked that a fair share matrix minimizes the entropy function over the feasible set R(a). The existence and uniqueness of solutions may be obtained by standard convex optimization techniques. This is well known for the equality constrained problem (see, e.g., [4] ). The RAS method may be generalized to the inequality problem and interpreted as a cyclic coordinate ascent method for maximizing the dual program [5] (see also [11] for interval convex programs). In the first example this set is nonempty whereas it is empty in the second one. 
It remains to show that given

II.1. Definitions and axioms. As before, a problem is a pair (p, o), but we are now interested in apportionments in R(a), that is, allocations all of whose components are integer valued. The central question of this part of the paper is: what does it mean to say that an apportionment a E R(a) is proportional to p and when do such apportionments exist?
It is assumed that, as before, p contains no row or column of zeros, and also that all of the components of a are integer valued. The set R?(p, o) (defined (in 1.4) plays a  central role so the reader is reminded that R?(p, a) 
# 0 for a integer valued if and only if it contains integer valued solutions (by a classical result of network flows [13]).
A method of apportionment A is a rule or mapping that assigns at least one apportionment to every problem: A(p, a) is a nonempty integer valued subset of R(a). The possibility of multiple apportionments is once again not excluded. The axioms that follow are directly inspired by those used for a method of allocation, and are discussed below. AXIOM 
1' (Exactness). If f = F*(p, a) is integer in all components, then A(p, a) = f. AXIOM 2' (Relevance). If A(p, o) n R(6) # 0 and R(6) c R(a) then A(p, 6) = A(p, a) n R(). AXIOM 3' (Uniformity). If a E A(p, a) then the same statements hold as do in Axiom 3 with A replacing F and a replacing f. AXIOM 4' (Monotonicity). If a E A(p, o), a' E A(p', a) and p' is equal to p except
AXIOM 6' (Completeness). If p" -> p and a E A(ps, o) for every s, then a E A(p, a).
An apportionment is simply an allocation with the additional requirement that each component be integer valued, so if the (unique) acceptable allocation is in integers then it is the unique solution. Axiom 2' is a slightly strengthened form of Axiom 2 which is justified identically. Axioms 3' and 4' are direct transcriptions of the real counterparts. Homogeneity as defined in Axiom 5' is a property that is true for fair share allocations satisfying Axioms 1 through 5: one can therefore not expect anything less to hold for apportionments. Completeness is a continuity axiom necessary in the case of apportionment problems that handles a difficulty that does not arise in the case of allocation problems. multipliers (8, X, .u) satisfying (4) will be said to be proper for a in A(p, o) .
Divisor methods of apportionments. A divisor function d is a strictly monotone real function defined over the nonnegative integers satisfying a < d(a)
The set of divisor method apportionments will take on the role of the fair share allocations: the integer requirement introduces some indecision on the meaning of "proportionality" that cannot be avoided.
Divisor To prove (5) we need to establish a number of facts. Since uniformity holds and the problem is free it suffices to consider two-population problems. We first show that: ((p, pp),  (2r-, 2r+,c-,c-,c+,c+,  2h) Consider now the problem of reporting census data [12] . In Canada, as well as most countries, census data are gathered with a guarantee of anonymity [19] . Given, however, arrays of many tables containing cross classifications concerning a community that is small in numbers, it may be possible to deduce the identity of certain subjects, and so fail the anonymity guarantee. To foil this possibility the counts in Canada are recorded as multiples of 5. If one wishes the data of the tables to add precisely to given row and column totals and be multiples of 5, the same apportion-ment problem is faced. Indeed the problem of apportionment may be said to concern how to round data so that all sums are precise: given the data pij, what a,i multiples of 5, should replace the corresponding p,i? Again the answer seems to be, proportional numbers. But then which divisor method should be used? In this context, the paramount concern is to produce proportional matrices that are "unbiased". Two alternative approaches commend themselves. If the sums of the rounded entries in each row (each column) is to be an unbiased rounding of Ejpij (of E,ipi), then Webster's method should be used to determine r = (r,), Ert analogous to using Hamilton's method or some method that "satisfies fair share" and this, we have already seen, cannot be realized by a method that is proportional.
